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Abstract
Recent results by Alagic and Russell have given some evidence that
the Even-Mansour cipher may be secure against quantum adversaries
with quantum queries, if considered over other groups than (Z/2)n.
This prompts the question as to whether or not other classical schemes
may be generalized to arbitrary groups and whether classical results
still apply to those generalized schemes.
In this paper, we generalize the Even-Mansour cipher and the Feis-
tel cipher. We show that Even and Mansour’s original notions of se-
crecy are obtained on a one-key, group variant of the Even-Mansour
cipher. We generalize the result by Kilian and Rogaway, that the
Even-Mansour cipher is pseudorandom, to super pseudorandomness,
also in the one-key, group case. Using a Slide Attack we match the
bound found above. After generalizing the Feistel cipher to arbitrary
groups we resolve an open problem of Patel, Ramzan, and Sundaram
by showing that the 3-round Feistel cipher over an arbitrary group is
not super pseudorandom.
Finally, we generalize a result by Gentry and Ramzan showing that
the Even-Mansour cipher can be implemented using the Feistel cipher
as the public permutation. In this last result, we also consider the
one-key case over a group and generalize their bound.
1 Introduction
In [EM97], Even and Mansour introduced and proved security for the DES
inspired block cipher scheme we now call the Even-Mansour (EM) scheme.
Given a public permutation, P , over n-bit strings, with two different, random,
secret, n-bit keys k1 and k2, a message x ∈ {0, 1}n could be enciphered as
EMPk1,k2(x) = P (x⊕ k1)⊕ k2,
∗This article is based on work done for my Master’s Thesis at the University of Copen-
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with an obvious decryption using the inverse public permutation. The scheme
was minimal, in the sense that they needed to XOR a key before and after
the permutation, otherwise the remaining key could easily be found. As an
improvement, Dunkelman, Keller, and Shamir [DKS12] showed that there
was only a need for a single key and the scheme would still retain an indis-
tinguishability from random, i.e. it was pseudorandom. As another consid-
eration of block ciphers, the Feistel cipher construction of Luby and Rackoff
[LR88] showed how to build pseudorandom permutations from pseudoran-
dom functions.
Eventually, Kuwakado and Morii showed that both the EM scheme [KM12]
and the Feistel scheme [KM10] could be broken by quantum adversaries with
quantum queries. Rather than discard these beautiful constructions entirely,
Alagic and Russell [AR17] considered whether it would be possible to de-
fine the two-key EM scheme over Abelian groups in order to retain security
against quantum adversaries with quantum queries. What they showed was
a security reduction to the Hidden Shift Problem, over certain groups, such
as Z/2n and Sn. This result inspires us to ask whether the EM and Feistel
schemes can be generalized over all groups, and if so, whether or not we can
get pseudorandomness in some model.
1.1 Prior Work
In extension of their simplification of the EM scheme, Dunkelman, Keller, and
Shamir [DKS12] attacked the construction using variants of slide attacks in
order to show that the security bound was optimal. They further considered
other variants of the EM scheme, such as the Addition Even-Mansour with
an Involution as the Permutation (two-keyed). Also Kilian and Rogaway
[KR01] were inspired by DESX and EM to define their FX construction, of
which the EM scheme is a special case.
As referred to above, Kuwakado and Morii were able to break the EM
scheme [KM12] and the 3-round Feistel scheme [KM10] on n-bit strings, using
Simon’s algorithm, if able to query their oracle with a superposition of states.
Kaplan et al. [KLLNP16], using Kuwakado and Morii’s results, showed how
to break many classical cipher schemes, which in turn incited Alagic and
Russell [AR17].
In their work with the Hidden Shift Problem, [AR17] posit that a Feistel
cipher construction over other groups than the bit strings might be secure
against quantum adversaries with quantum queries. Many Feistel cipher vari-
ants exist, with different relaxations on the round functions, see for example
[NR99] and [PRS02], the latter of which also considered Feistel ciphers over
other groups. Vaudenay [Vau98] also considered Feistel ciphers over other
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groups in order to protect such ciphers against differential analysis attacks
by what he called decorrelation.
Removed from the schemes considered below and with a greater degree of
abstraction, Black and Rogaway [BR02] consider ciphers over arbitrary do-
mains. In general, on the question of the existence of quantum pseudorandom
permutations, see [Zha16].
1.2 Summary of Results
We work in the Random Oracle Model and consider groups G in the family of
finite groups, G. We consider pseudorandom permutations, given informally
as the following.
Definition 1. [Informal] A keyed permutation P on a group G is a Pseu-
dorandom Permutation (PRP) on G if it is indistinguishable from a
random permutation for all probabilistic distinguishers having access to only
polynomially many permutation-oracle queries.
A Super Pseudorandom Permutation (SPRP) is a permutation
where the distinguisher is given access to the inverse permutation-oracle as
well.
We define the Group Even-Mansour (EM) scheme on G to be the
encryption scheme having the encryption algorithm
Ek(m) = P (m · k) · k,
where m ∈ G is the plaintext and k ∈ G is the uniformly random key.
We define two problems for the Group Even-Mansour scheme: Exis-
tential Forgery (EFP) and Cracking (CP). In EFP, the adversary must
eventually output a plaintext-ciphertext pair which satisfies correctness. In
CP, the adversary is given a ciphertext and asked to find the corresponding
plaintext.
It holds that for our Group EM scheme, the probability that an adversary
succeeds in the EFP is polynomially bounded:
Theorem 2. [Informal] If P is a uniformly random permutation on G and
k ∈ G is chosen uniformly at random. Then, for any probabilistic adversary
A, the success probability of solving the EFP is negligible, specifically, bounded
by
O
(
st
|G|
)
,
where s and t are the amount of encryption/decryption- and permutation/inverse
permutation-oracle queries, respectively.
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By a basic reduction, and for the latter, by an inference result, we also
get that
Theorem 3. [Informal] If P is a super pseudorandom permutation on G
and k ∈ G is chosen uniformly at random. For any probabilistic adversary
A, the success probability of solving the EFP is negligible.
Corollary 4. [Informal] If P is a super pseudorandom permutation on G
and k ∈ G is chosen uniformly at random. For any polynomial-time proba-
bilistic adversary A, the success probability of solving the CP is negligible.
With the same bound as in Theorem 2, we find that
Theorem 5. [Informal] For any probabilistic adversary A, limited to poly-
nomially many encryption- and decryption-oracle queries and polynomially
many permutation- and inverse permutation-oracle queries, the Group EM
scheme over a group G is a super pseudorandom permutation.
We then apply a Slide Attack, to find an attack which matches the bound
given above.
Considering theGroup Feistel cipher, whose encryption algorithm con-
sists of multiple uses of the round function
Ff (x, y) = (y, x · f(y)),
where f is a pseudorandom function on G, we show that the 3-round Feistel
cipher is pseudorandom but is not super pseudorandom, regardless of the
underlying group G. We then note that the 4-round Feistel cipher is super
pseudorandom as proven in [PRS02].
Finally, we consider the Group Even-Mansour scheme instantiated
using a 4-round Feistel cipher overG2 = G×G, which uses the encryption
algorithm
Ψf,gk (m) = Fg,f,f,g(m · k) · k,
where f and g are modelled as random functions, m ∈ G2 the plaintext, and
k ∈ G2 is a uniformly random key. We then show one of our main results:
Theorem 6. [Informal] For any probabilistic 4-oracle adversary A with at
most
• qc queries to the Ψ- and inverse Ψ-oracles (or random oracles),
• qf queries to the f -oracle, and
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• qg queries to the g-oracle,
we have that the success probability of A distinguishing between Ψ and a
random oracle, is bounded by
(2q2c + 4qfqc + 4qgqc + 2q
2
c − 2qc)|G|−1 + 2 ·
(
qc
2
)
(2|G|−1 + |G|−2).
We may also rewrite our main theorem as the following:
Theorem 7. [Informal] For any 4-oracle adversary A, with at most q total
queries, we have that the success probability of A distinguishing between Ψ
and a random oracle, is bounded by
2(3q2 − 2q)|G|−1 + (q2 − q)|G|−2.
We note that this main result is due to [GR04], however, we consider a
one-key group version and add details to their proof sketches.
1.3 Outline of Paper
In Section 2, we state the assumptions for this paper. In Section 2, we give
definitions that hold for the paper in general, leaving specialized definitions
to the various sections. In Section 3, we introduce the generalized EM scheme
over arbitrary groups, stating and proving some results about it. In Section 4,
we define the generalized Feistel cipher over arbitrary groups and prove a few
small results about it. In Section 5, we consider an implementation of the
generalized EM scheme using the generalized Feistel cipher as the public
permutation. In Section 6, we give our concluding remarks.
2 General Definitions
In the following, we work in the Random Oracle Model such that we may
assume the existence of a random permutation oracle on group elements. We
let G be the family of all finite groups, e.g. a group G ∈ G is a pair of the set
G and operation · satisfying the group axioms. We also assume that for any
group G ∈ G, |G| ≤ 2poly(n) for some n ∈ N and some polynomial poly(·).
We will need the concept of pseudorandom, which is also called indistin-
guishable from random, in several forms. On notation, we write x ∈R X
for an element chosen uniformly at random from a set X. In the following,
we consider the positive integer λ to be the security parameter, specified in
unary per convention. We assume that for each λ there exists a uniquely
specified group G(λ) = Gλ ∈ G with size |Gλ| ≥ 2λ.
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Definition 8. Let Fm,n : Gλ × Gm → Gn, for Gm, Gn ∈ G, be an efficient,
keyed function. Fm,n is a pseudorandom function (PRF) if for all prob-
abilistic distinguishers A, limited to only polynomially many queries to the
function-oracle, there exists a negligible function negl(·), such that∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [AFm,n(k,·)(λ) = 1]− Prpi∈RFGm→Gn [Api(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
where FGm→Gn is the set of functions from Gm to Gn.
If F : G × G → G is a pseudorandom function, we say that it is a
pseudorandom function on G.
Definition 9. Let P : Gλ×G→ G be an efficient, keyed permutation. P is a
pseudorandom permutation (PRP) if for all probabilistic distinguishers
A, limited to only polynomially many queries to the permutation-oracle, there
exists a negligible function negl(·), such that∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [AP (k,·)(λ) = 1]− Prpi∈RPG→G [Api(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
where PG→G is the set of permutations on G.
Definition 10. Let P : Gλ × G → G be an efficient, keyed permutation.
P is said to be a super pseudorandom permutation (SPRP) if for all
probabilistic distinguishers A, limited to only polynomially many queries to
the permutation- and inverse permutation-oracles, there exists a negligible
function negl(·), such that∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [AP (k,·),P−1(k,·)(λ) = 1]− Prpi∈RPG→G [Api(·),pi−1(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
where PG→G is the set of permutations on G.
A (super) pseudorandom permutation P : G × G → G is said to be a
(super) pseudorandom permutation on G.
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3 Even-Mansour
We first remark that the results in this section were initially proven in a
project prior to the start of the thesis but were further worked on to com-
plement this thesis. Thus we have chosen to include parts of it, while this
inclusion accounts for the brevity in certain results. We begin by defining
the one-key Even-Mansour scheme over arbitrary groups, which we will refer
to as the Group EM scheme.
Definition 11. We define the Group Even-Mansour scheme to be the
triple of a key generation algorithm, encryption algorithm, and decryption
algorithm. The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parame-
ter 1λ, fixes and outputs a group G ∈R G with |G| ≥ 2λ, and outputs a key
k ∈R G. The encryption algorithm Ek(m) takes as input the key k and a
plaintext m ∈ G and outputs
Ek(m) = P (m · k) · k,
where P is the public permutation. The decryption algorithm Dk(c) takes as
input the key k and a ciphertext c ∈ G and outputs
Dk(c) = P
−1(c · k−1) · k−1,
where P−1 is the inverse public permutation. This definition satisfies cor-
rectness.
3.1 Two Forms of Security for the Group EM Scheme
In this subsection, we prove classical results about our new scheme. We do so
by considering Even and Mansour’s two notions of security: the Existential
Forgery Problem and the Cracking Problem, the Cracking Problem being the
stronger of the two.
Definition 12. In the Existential Forgery Problem (EFP), we consider
the following game:
1. A group G ∈ G and a key k ∈R G are generated.
2. The adversary A gets the security parameter, in unary, and the group
G.
3. A receives oracle access to the Ek, Dk, P, and P−1 oracles.
4. A eventually outputs a pair (m, c).
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If Ek(m) = c, and (m, c) has not been queried before, we say that A succeeds.
In the Cracking Problem (CP), we consider the following game:
1. A group G ∈ G and a key k ∈R G are generated.
2. The adversary A gets the security parameter, in unary, and the group
G.
3. A is presented with Ek(m0) = c0 ∈R G.
4. A receives oracle access to the Ek, Dk, P, and P−1 oracles, but the de-
cryption oracle outputs ⊥ if A queries c = c0.
5. A outputs a plaintext m.
If Dk(c0) = m, then we say that A succeeds. The success probability is the
probability that on a uniformly random chosen encryption c0 = Ek(m0), A
outputs m0.
Even and Mansour show that polynomial-time EFP security infers poly-
nomial-time CP security. There are no limiting factors prohibiting the prob-
lems and inference result from being employed on groups. In fact, there is
nothing disallowing the use of the same proof of the EFP security for the EFP
security of the one-key EM scheme, as noted in [DKS12], which we therefore
omit. Indeed, by redefining notions in the [EM97] proof to take into account
that we are working over a not necessarily abelian group, we are able to prove
that the Group EM scheme satisfies the EFP notion of security, specifically
the following.
Theorem 13. Assume P ∈R PG→G and let the key k ∈R G. For any prob-
abilistic adversary A, the success probability of solving the EFP is bounded
by
Succ(A) = Prk,P [EFP (A) = 1] = O
(
st
|G|
)
,
where s is the number of E/D-queries and t is the number of P/P−1-queries,
i.e. the success probability is negligible.
By the Even and Mansour inference result, we get the corollary below.
Corollary 14. Assume P ∈R PG→G and let the key k ∈R G. For any
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, the success probability of
solving the Cracking Problem is negligible.
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As Even and Mansour also note, the above results may be extended to
instances where the permutation is a pseudorandom permutation by a simple
reduction. Hence, we get the following two results.
Theorem 15. Assume P is a pseudorandom permutation on G ∈ G and let
the key k ∈R G. For any probabilistic adversary A with only polynomially
many queries to its oracles, the success probability of solving the Existential
Forgery Problem is negligible.
Corollary 16. Assume P is a pseudorandom permutation on G ∈ G and let
the key k ∈R G. For any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A,
the success probability of solving the Cracking Problem is negligible.
3.2 Pseudorandomness Property of the Group EM Scheme
Although the above notions of security are strong, we are more interested
in any pseudorandomness property the Group EM scheme offers us. Kilian
and Rogaway [KR01] show that the one-key EM scheme satisfies the pseu-
dorandom permutation property, i.e. with only an encryption oracle and the
permutation oracles, the EM scheme is indistinguishable from random to any
adversary with only polynomially many queries to its oracles. We note that
they only show the pseudorandomness property, but state in their discussion
section that their proof may be adapted to include a decryption oracle, i.e.
that the one-key EM scheme satisfies the super pseudorandom permutation
property. Having done the analysis with the decryption oracle, over an arbi-
trary group, we concur. However, we were also able to generalize the [KR01]
proof to a one-key construction. This not entirely remarkable as the key k
will usually be different from its group inverse, hence we were able to use
the same proof, but with adjustments to the games and their analysis. The
proof is given in the appendix for posterity. For completeness, we present
the result as the following theorem.
Theorem 17. Assume P ∈R PG→G and let the key k ∈R G. For any
probabilistic adversary A, limited to polynomially many E/D- and P/P−1-
oracle queries, the adversarial advantage of A is bounded by
Adv(A) def=
∣∣∣Pr [AP,P−1Ek,Dk = 1]− Pr [AP,P−1pi,pi−1 = 1]∣∣∣ = O( st|G|
)
.
where s is the number of E/D-queries and t is the number of P/P−1-queries,
i.e. the success probability is negligible.
Stated simply,
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Theorem 18. For any probabilistic adversary A, limited to polynomially
many E/D- and P/P−1-oracle queries, the Group EM scheme over a group
G is a super pseudorandom permutation.
By removing the decryption oracle, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 19. For any probabilistic adversary A, limited to polynomially
many E- and P/P−1-oracle queries, the Group EM scheme over a group G
is a pseudorandom permutation.
Remark. We see that in the group ((Z/2Z)n,⊕), our Group EM scheme
reduces to the one-key EM scheme given in [DKS12]. The proof given in
[DKS12] proves the security of the scheme, and the proof given in [KR01]
proves the pseudorandomness, equivalently to our claims.
It can be proven that a multiple round Group EM scheme is an SPRP
because the security only depends on the last round, which is also an SPRP.
3.3 Slide Attack
We would like to show that the security bound that we have found above
is optimal, so we slightly alter the simple optimal attack on the Single-Key
Even-Mansour cipher as constructed in [DKS12]. The original version works
for abelian groups with few adjustments and [DKS12] also present another
slide attack against a modular addition DESX construction.
Consider the one-key Group Even-Mansour cipher
E(x) = P (x · k) · k,
over a group G with binary operation ·, where P is a publicly available
permutation oracle, x ∈ G, and k ∈R G. Define the following values:
x = x, y = x · k, z = P (y), w = E(x) = P (x · k) · k.
We hereby have that w · y−1 = z · x−1. Consider the attack which follows.
1. For d =
√|G| arbitrary values xi ∈ G, i = 1, . . . , d, and d arbitrary
values yi ∈ G, i = 1, . . . , d, query the E-oracle on the xi’s and the
P -oracle on the yi’s. Store the values in a hash table as
(E(xi) · y−1i , P (yi) · x−1i , i),
sorted by the first coordinate.
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2. If there exists a match in the above step, i.e. E(xi) · y−1i = P (yi) · x−1i
for some i, check the guess that k = x−1i · yi.
It can be seen by the Birthday Problem1, that with non-negligible probability,
there must exist a slid pair (xi, yi) satisfying the above property, i.e. there
exists 1 ≤ i ≤ d such that k = x−1i · yi. For a random pair (x, y) ∈ G2 it
holds that E(x) = P (y) · x−1 · y with probability |G|−1, so we expect few, if
any, collisions in the hash table, including the collision by the slid pair where
the correct key k is found. The data complexity of the attack is d E-oracle
queries and d P -oracle queries. Hence the attack bound d2 = |G|, which
matches the lower bound given in Theorem 13 and Theorem 39. We have
therefore found that our scheme is optimal.
1Considering the approximation p(n) ≈ n22m , where p(n) is the probability of there being
a Birthday Problem collision from n randomly chosen elements from the set ofm elements,
then p(
√|G|) ≈ √|G|22|G| = 1/2.
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4 Feistel
We now consider the Feistel cipher over arbitrary groups, which we will call
the Group Feistel cipher. The following is a complement to [PRS02] who
treat the Group Feistel cipher construction with great detail. Our main
accomplishment in this section is the settling of an open problem posed by
them.
4.1 Definitions
We define a Feistel cipher over a group (G, ·) as a series of round functions
on elements of G×G = G2.
Definition 20. Given an efficiently computable but not necessarily invertible
function f : G → G, called a round function, we define the 1-round
Group Feistel cipher Ff to be
Ff : G×G −→ G×G,
(x, y) 7−→ (y, x · f(y)).
In the case where we have multiple rounds, we index the round functions as
fi, and denote the r-round Group Feistel cipher by Ff1,...,fr . We con-
currently denote the input to the i’th round by (Li−1, Ri−1) and having the
output (Li, Ri) = (Ri−1, Li−1 · fi(Ri−1)), where Li and Ri respectively denote
the left and right parts of the i’th output.
Note that if (Li, Ri) is the i’th round output, we may invert the i’th round
by setting Ri−1 := Li and then computing Li−1 := Ri · (fi(Ri−1))−1 to get
(Li−1, Ri−1). As this holds for all rounds, regardless of the invertibility of the
round functions, we get that an r-round Feistel cipher is invertible for all r.
Let F : Gλ × G → G be a pseudorandom function. We define the keyed
permutation F (r) as
F
(r)
k1,...,kr
(x, y)
def
= FFk1 ,...,Fkr (x, y).
We sometimes index the keys as 1, 2, . . . , r, or omit the key index entirely.
4.2 Results
For completeness, we show some of the preliminary results for Group Feistel
ciphers, not considered in [PRS02].
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We first note that F (1) is not a pseudorandom permutation as
F
(1)
k1
(L0, R0) = (L1, R1) = (R0, L0 · Fk1(R0)),
such that any distinguisher A need only compare R0 to L1.
Also F (2) is not a pseudorandom permutation: Consider a pseudorandom
function F on G. Pick k1, k2 ∈R Gλ. Distinguisher A sets (L0, R0) = (1, g)
for some g ∈ G, where 1 is the identity element of G, then queries (L0, R0)
to its oracle and receives,
L2 = L0 ·Fk1(R0) = Fk1(g) and R2 = R0 ·Fk2(L0 ·Fk1(R0)) = g ·Fk2(Fk1(g)).
On its second query, the distinguisher A lets L0 ∈ G \ {1} but R0 = g, such
that it receives
L2 = L0 · Fk1(R0) = L0 · Fk1(g) and R2 = g · Fk2(L0 · Fk1(g)).
As A may find the inverse to elements in G, A acquires (Fk1(g))−1, and
by so doing, may compute L2 · (Fk1(g))−1 = L0. If F (2) were random, this
would only occur negligibly many times, while A may query its permutation-
oracle polynomially many times such that if L0 is retrieved non-negligibly
many times out of the queries, A is able to distinguish between a random
permutation and F (2) with non-negligible probability.
As one would expect, the 3-round Group Feistel cipher (see Figure 1a) is
indeed a pseudorandom permutation.
Theorem 21. If F is a pseudorandom function on G, then F (3) is a pseu-
dorandom permutation on G.
The proof of this proposition can be generalized from the proof given in
Katz and Lindell [KL15] of the analogous result over bit-strings with XOR,
with no difficulties. We therefore omit it here.
Among the considerations in [PRS02], they showed that the 3-round Feis-
tel cipher over abelian groups was not super pseudorandom, but left as an
open problem a proof over non-abelian groups. We present such a proof now.
Proposition 22. The 3-round Group Feistel cipher is not super pseudoran-
dom.
Proof. The proof is a counter-example using the following procedure:
1. Choose two oracle-query pairs in G × G: (L0, R0) and (L′0, R0) where
L0 6= L′0.
2TikZ figure adapted from [Jea16].
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f1
f2
f3
L0 R0
L3 R3
(a) 3-round Group Feistel cipher.
g
f
f
g
xL
·kL
xR
·kR
yL
·kL
yR
·kR
(b) Group EM scheme with Feistel.2
Figure 2: Encryption schemes.
2. Query the encryption oracle to get (L3, R3) and (L′3, R′3).
3. Query (L′′3, R′′3) = (L′3, L0 · (L′0)−1 ·R′3) to the decryption oracle.
4. If R′′0 = L′3 · (L3)−1 ·R0, guess that the oracle is F (3), else guess random.
For F (3), this algorithm succeeds with probability 1. For a random permu-
tation, this algorithm succeeds negligibly often. 
For super pseudorandomness of the 4-round Group Feistel cipher, we refer
the reader to [PRS02]. In the paper, they show a strong result using certain
hash functions as round functions, from which the following is a corollary.
Corollary 23. Let G be a group, with characteristic other than 2, and let
f, g : Gλ × G → G be pseudorandom functions. Then, for any adversary
A with polynomially many queries to its E/D-oracles, the family P of per-
mutations on G × G consisting of permutations of the form F (4) = Fg,f,f,g
are indistinguishable from random, i.e. super pseudorandom permutations
(SPRPs).
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5 Implementing the Group Even-Mansour Scheme
Now that we have shown that both the Even-Mansour scheme and the Feis-
tel cipher are generalizable to arbitrary groups, we might consider how to
implement one given the other. Gentry and Ramzan [GR04] considered ex-
actly this for the two-key EM scheme over (Z/2Z)n. However, their paper
only had sketches of proofs and refer to another edition of the paper for full
details. As we are unable to find a copy in the place that they specify it to
exist, and as we generalize their result non-trivially, we have decided to fill
in the details while generalizing their proof.
In this section, we consider a generalized version of the Gentry and
Ramzan [GR04] construction, namely, the Group Even-Mansour scheme on
G2 instantiated with a 4-round Group Feistel cipher as the public permuta-
tion:
Ψf,gk (x) = Fg,f,f,g(x · k) · k,
where k = (kL, kR) ∈ G2 is a key consisting of two subkeys, chosen inde-
pendently and uniformly at random, and f and g are round functions on G,
modelled as random function oracles, available to all parties, including the
adversary. We consider the operation x · k for x = (xL, xR) ∈ G2, to be the
coordinate-wise group operation, but do not otherwise discern between it and
the group operation · on elements of G. In the following, we shall follow the
proof in [GR04] closely. However, we make quite a few modifications, mostly
due to the nature of our generalization. Note that we consider a one-key
scheme, as opposed to the two-key version in [GR04] (see Figure 1b.) Our
main theorem for this section is the following.
Theorem 24. Let f, g be modelled as random oracles and let the subkeys of
k = (kL, kR) ∈ G2 be chosen independently and uniformly at random. Let
Ψf,gk (x) = Fg,f,f,g(x ·k) ·k, and let R ∈R PG2→G2. Then, for any probabilistic
4-oracle adversary A with at most
• qc queries to Ψ and Ψ−1 (or R and R−1),
• qf queries to f , and
• qg queries to g,
we have∣∣∣Pr [AΨ,Ψ−1,f,g = 1]− Pr [AR,R−1,f,g = 1]∣∣∣
≤ (2q2c + 4qfqc + 4qgqc + 2q2c − 2qc)|G|−1 + 2 ·
(
qc
2
)
(2|G|−1 + |G|−2).
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5.1 Definitions
Before we can begin the proof, we will need several definitions all of which
are identical to the [GR04] definitions, up to rewording.
Definition 25. Let P denote the permutation oracle (either Ψ or R), Of
and Og the f and g oracles, respectively. We get the transcripts: TP , the set
of all P queries, Tf , the set of all f queries, and Tg, the set of all g queries,
i.e. the sets
TP = {〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, · · · , 〈xqc , yqc〉}P ,
Tf = {〈x′1, y′1〉, 〈x′2, y′2〉, · · · , 〈x′qf , y′qf 〉}f ,
Tg = {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, 〈x′′2, y′′2〉, · · · , 〈x′′qg , y′′qg〉}g.
We discern between two types of oracle queries: Cipher queries (+, x) = P (x)
and (−, y) = P−1(y); Oracle queries (Of , x′) and (Og, x′′), respectively f - and
g-oracle queries.
As we have no bounds on the computational complexity of the adversary
A, we may assume that A is deterministic, as we did in the proof of Theo-
rem 39. Hence, we may consider an algorithm CA which, given a set of A’s
queries, can determine A’s next query.
Definition 26. For 0 ≤ i ≤ qc, 0 ≤ j ≤ qf , and 0 ≤ k ≤ qg, the i+j+k+1’st
query by A is
CA
[{〈x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈xi, yi〉}P , {〈x′1, y′1〉, . . . , 〈x′j, y′j〉}f , {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, . . . , 〈x′′k, y′′k〉}g]
where the upper equality case on the indexes is defined to be A’s final output.
Definition 27. Let σ = (TP , Tf , Tg) be a tuple of transcripts with length
qc, qf , qg, respectively. We say that σ is a possible A-transcript if for every
1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , and 1 ≤ k ≤ qg,
CA
[{〈x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈xi, yi〉}P , {〈x′1, y′1〉, . . . , 〈x′j, y′j〉}f , {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, . . . , 〈x′′k, y′′k〉}g]
∈ {(+, xi+1), (−, yi+1), (Of , x′j+1), (Og, x′′k+1)}.
Let us define two useful ways in which we may answer A’s queries other
than what we have already defined.
Definition 28. Let Ψ˜ be the process where the Ψ- and Ψ−1 cipher query
oracles use f and g, and Of uses f , but Og is replaced by Oh for another,
independent, random function h.
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Definition 29. Let R˜ denote the process which answers all oracle queries
using f and g, but answers the i’th cipher query as follows.
1. If A queries (+, xi) and there exists 1 ≤ j < i, such that the j’th
query-answer pair has xj = xi, return yi := yj.
2. If A queries (−, yi) and there exists 1 ≤ j < i, such that the j’th
query-answer pair has yj = yi, return xi := xj.
3. Otherwise, return uniformly chosen element in G2.
The latter definition may not be consistent with any function or permu-
tation, so we formalize exactly this event.
Definition 30. Let TP be a possible A-cipher-transcript. TP is inconsistent
if for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc there exist cipher-pairs such that either
• xi = xj but yi 6= yj, or
• xi 6= xj but yi = yj.
Any σ containing such a transcript TP is called inconsistent.
Note. Assume from now on that A never repeats any part of a query if
the answer can be determined from previous queries, i.e. every possible A-
transcript σ is consistent such that if i 6= j, then xi 6= xj, yi 6= yj, x′i 6= x′j,
and x′′i 6= x′′j .
Note. Let TΨ, TΨ˜, TR˜, TR denote the transcripts seen by A when its cipher
queries are answered by Ψ, Ψ˜, R˜, R, respectively, and oracle queries by Of
and Og (noting that in the case of Ψ˜, the function in the Og has been replaced
by another random function, h.) We also note that using this notation, we
have that AΨ,Ψ−1,f,g = CA(TΨ) (and likewise for Ψ˜, R˜, and R.)
5.2 Lemmas
Now, let us begin finding results that will aid us in proving our main theorem.
First, we will compare the distributions of R˜ and R, using a result by Naor-
Reingold3. Afterwards, we shall consider when the distributions of Ψ and Ψ˜
are equal. Lastly, we shall consider when the distributions of Ψ˜ and R˜ are
equal. Combining these results will allow us to prove our main theorem.
We remark that whenever we write k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2, we mean that
the subkeys are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
3The proof of the proposition follows the argument of Proposition 3.3 in [NR99].
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Lemma 31.
∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1]− Pr
R
[CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (qc2
)
· |G|−2.
Proof. Let σ be a possible and consistent A-transcript, then
Pr
R
[TR = σ] =
(|G|2
qc
)
= Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ | TR˜ is consistent] ,
simply because the only difference between TR and TR˜ is in the cipher queries,
and when TR˜ is consistent, we have no overlap on the query-answer pairs,
hence we need only consider how to choose qc elements from |G|2 many
possible elements, without replacement. Let us now consider the probability
of TR˜ being inconsistent. If TR˜ is inconsistent for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc then
either xi = xj and yi 6= yj, or xi 6= xj and yi = yj. For any given i, j,
this happens with at most probability |G|−2, because if xi = xj is queried,
then the R˜-oracle would return the corresponding yi = yj, but if xi 6= xj is
queried, then the R˜-oracle would return a uniformly random element (and
likewise if yi = yj or yi 6= yj were queried to the inverse R˜-oracle.) Hence,
Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is inconsistent] ≤
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−2.
We thereby get that,∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1|TR˜ is consistent]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ · Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is consistent]
+
∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1|TR˜ is inconsistent]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ · Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is inconsistent]
≤ Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is inconsistent]
≤
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−2,
as the distribution over R is independent of the (in)consistency of TR˜. 
Let us now focus on the distributions of TΨ and TΨ˜, to show that they
are identical unless the input to g in the cipher query to Ψ is equal to the
oracle input to h in Oh. In order to do so, we first define the event BadG(k).
Definition 32. For every specific key k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2, we define BadG(k)
to be the set of all possible and consistent A-transcripts σ, satisfying at least
one of the following:
BG1: ∃i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qg, such that xRi · kR = x′′j , or
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BG2: ∃i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qg, such that yLi · (kL)−1 = x′′j .
Lemma 33. Let k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2. For any possible and consistent A-
transcript σ = (TP , Tf , Tg), we have
Pr
k
[σ ∈ BadG(k)] ≤ 2qgqc|G| .
Proof. We know that σ ∈ BadG(k) if one of BG1 or BG2 occur, hence,
using the union bound,
Pr
k
[σ ∈ BadG(k)] = Pr
k
[BG1 occurs ∨BG2 occurs |σ]
≤ Pr
k
[BG1 occurs |σ] + Pr
k
[BG2 occurs |σ]
≤ qgqc · |G|−1 + qgqc · |G|−1
= 2qgqc · |G|−1.

Lemma 34. Let σ be a possible and consistent A-transcript, then
Pr
Ψ
[TΨ = σ|σ 6∈ BadG(k)] = Pr
Ψ˜
[TΨ˜ = σ] .
Proof. We want to show that the query answers in the subtranscripts of the
games Ψ and Ψ˜ are equally distributed, under the condition that neither of
the events BG1 nor BG2 occur in game Ψ. Fix the key k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2.
Recall that the adversary does not query an oracle if it can determine the
answer from previous queries.
In both games, for any Of -oracle query x′ ∈ G, the query answer will
be equally distributed in both games as the underlying random function f is
the same in both games.
In game Ψ, an Og-oracle query, x′′ ∈ G, will have a uniformly random
answer as g is a random function. Likewise, in game Ψ˜, an Og-oracle query,
x′′ ∈ G, will have a uniformly random answer as h is a random function.
Consider now the permutation oracle P = Fg,f,f,g(x · k) · k. We consider
a query-answer pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ TP for x, y ∈ G2.
In both games, xR ·kR will be the input to the first round function, which
is g. In game Ψ˜ the output is always a uniformly random element, newly
selected by g. In game Ψ, if xR ·kR has already been queried to the Og-oracle,
the output of the round function is the corresponding oracle answer, else it
is a uniformly random element, newly selected by g. As the former event in
game Ψ never occurs because the event BG1 never occurs, the distributions
are equal.
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As both games have access to the same random function f , the second
and third round function outputs will have equal distributions.
In both games, yL · (kL)−1 will be the input to the fourth round function,
which is again g. In game Ψ˜ the output is always a uniformly random element,
newly selected by g, unless yL · (kL)−1 = xR · kR, in which case the output
is equal to the output of the first round function. In game Ψ, if xR · kR has
already been queried to the Og-oracle, but not as input to the first round
function, the output of the round function is the corresponding oracle answer.
If yL · (kL)−1 = xR · kR, then the output is equal to the output of the first
round function, else it is a uniformly random element newly selected by g.
As the former event in game Ψ never occurs because the event BG2 never
occurs, the distributions are equal.
As A does not ask a query if it can determine the answer based on pre-
vious queries, we see that the inverse permutation oracle, using P−1, yields
analogous distributions. Thus, the distributions for the two games must be
equal. 
Let us show that the distributions of TΨ˜ and TR˜ are identical, unless the
same value is input to f on two separate occasions. Here we also define
when a key is "bad" as we did above, but altered such that it pertains to our
current oracles.
Definition 35. For every specific key k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2 and function
g ∈R FG→G, define Bad(k, g) to be the set of all possible and consistent A-
transcripts σ satisfying at least one of the following events:
B1: ∃1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, such that
xLi · kL · g(xRi · kR) = xLj · kL · g(xRj · kR)
B2: ∃1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, such that
yRi · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLi · (kL)−1)
)−1
= yRj · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLj · (kL)−1)
)−1
B3: ∃1 ≤ i, j ≤ qc, such that
xLi · kL · g(xRi · kR) = yRj · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLj · (kL)−1)
)−1
B4: ∃1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , such that
xLi · kL · g(xRi · kR) = x′j
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B5: ∃1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , such that
yRi · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLi · (kL)−1)
)−1
= x′j
Lemma 36. Let k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2. For any possible and consistent A-
transcript σ, we have that
Pr
k,g
[σ ∈ Bad(k, g)] ≤
(
q2c + 2qfqc + 2 ·
(
qc
2
))
· |G|−1.
Proof. We have that σ ∈ Bad(k, g) if it satisfies a Bi for some i = {1, . . . , 5}.
Using that kL, kR are uniform and independently chosen, and g ∈R FG→G,
we may achieve an upper bound on the individual event probabilities, and
then use the union bound.
There are
(
qc
2
)
many ways of picking i, j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, also,
qfqc many ways of picking i, j such that 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , and q2c many
ways of picking i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qc. The probability that two elements
chosen from G are equal is |G|−1, so we may bound each event accordingly
and achieve, using the union bound, that
Pr
k,g
[σ ∈ Bad(k, g)] = Pr
k,g
[
5∨
i=1
Bi occurs |σ
]
≤
5∑
i=1
Pr
k,g
[Bi occurs |σ]
≤
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−1 +
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−1 + q2c · |G|−1 + qfqc · |G|−1 + qfqc · |G|−1
=
(
q2c + 2qfqc + 2
(
qc
2
))
· |G|−1.

Lemma 37. Let σ be a possible and consistent A-transcript, then
Pr
Ψ˜
[TΨ˜ = σ|σ 6∈ Bad(k, g)] = Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ] .
The following proof is based on the proof in [GR04] which refers to [NR99]
for the first part of their argument. We need the generalization of this argu-
ment and so also include it.
Proof. Since σ is a possible A-transcript, we have for all 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤
qf , 1 ≤ k ≤ qg:
CA
[{〈x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈xi, yi〉}P , {〈x′1, y′1〉, . . . , 〈x′j, y′j〉}f , {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, . . . , 〈x′′k, y′′k〉}g]
∈ {(+, xi+1), (−, yi+1), (Of , x′j+1), (Og, x′′k+1)}.
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Therefore, TR˜ = σ if and only if ∀1 ≤ i ≤ qc,∀1 ≤ j ≤ qf , and ∀1 ≤
k ≤ qg, the i, j, k’th respective answers R˜ gives are yi or xi, and x′j and
x′′k, respectively. As A never repeats any part of a query, we have, by the
definition of R˜, that the i’th cipher-query answer is an independent and
uniform element of G2, and as f and g were modelled as random function
oracles, so too will their oracle outputs be independent and uniform elements
of G. Hence,
Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ] = |G|−(2qc+qf+qg).
For the second part of this proof, we fix k, g such that σ 6∈ Bad(k, g) and
seek to compute Pr
f,h
[TΨ˜ = σ]. Since σ is a possible A-transcript, we have
that TΨ˜ = σ if and only if
• yi = Fg,f,f,g(xi · k) · k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ qc,
• y′j = f(x′j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , and
• y′′k = g(x′′k) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ qg (note that g = h here.)
If we define
Xi := x
L
i · kL · g(xRi · kR)
Yi := y
R
i · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLi · (kL)−1)
)−1
,
then (yLi , yRi ) = Ψ˜(xLi , xRi ) if and only if
kR · f(Xi) = (xRi )−1 · Yi and Xi · f(Yi) = yLi · (kL)−1,
where the second equality of the latter is equivalent to (kL)−1 · (f(Yi))−1 =
(yLi )
−1 · Xi. Observe that, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, Xi 6= Xj (by B1 ) and
Yi 6= Yj (by B2.) Similarly, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, Xi 6= Yj (by B3.) Also, for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ qc and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , x′j 6= Xi (by B4 ) and x′j 6= Yi (by
B5.) Hence, σ 6∈ Bad(k, g) implies that all inputs to f are distinct. This
then implies that Prf,h [TΨ˜ = σ] = |G|−(2qc+qf+qg) as h was also modelled as
a random function, independent from g. Thus, as we assumed that k and g
were chosen such that σ 6∈ Bad(k, g),
Pr
Ψ˜
[TΨ˜ = σ|σ 6∈ Bad(k, g)] = |G|−(2qc+qf+qg) = Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ] .

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5.3 Proof of Theorem 24
To complete the proof of Theorem 24, we combine the above lemmas into
the following probability estimation.
Proof of Theorem 24. Let Γ be the set of all possible and consistent A-
transcripts σ such that A(σ) = 1. In the following, we ease notation, for
the sake of the reader. We let BadG(k) be denoted by BadG and Bad(k, g)
by Bad. Furthermore, we abbreviate inconsistency as incon.. Let us consider
the cases between Ψ, Ψ˜ and R˜.
|PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ])
∣∣∣∣∣+ PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ incon.]
≤
∑
σ∈Γ
|PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ 6∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]| · Prk [σ 6∈ BadG]
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
∣∣∣∣∣
+ PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ incon.]
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
∣∣∣∣∣+ qc(qc − 1)|G|−1,
where we in the last estimate used Lemma 34 and a consideration of the
maximal amount of possible inconsistent pairs.
At the same time,
|PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]− PrR˜ [CA(TR˜) = 1]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ])
∣∣∣∣∣+ PrR˜ [TR˜ incon.] + PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜incon.]
≤
∑
σ∈Γ
|PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ 6∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]| · Prk [σ 6∈ Bad]
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
∣∣∣∣∣
+ PrR˜ [TR˜ incon.] + PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜incon.]
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
∣∣∣∣∣+
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2 + 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−1,
where we in the last estimate used Lemma 37 and the proof of Lemma 31.
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Let us use the above in a temporary estimate,
|PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]|
= |PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]|
+ |PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]− PrR˜ [CA(TR˜) = 1]|
+ |PrR˜ [CA(TR˜) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
∣∣∣∣∣+ qc(qc − 1)|G|−1
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
∣∣∣∣∣+
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2 + 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−1
+
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2, (1)
where we in the last estimate also used Lemma 31.
We may assume WLOG that∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] ≤
∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
and likewise,∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ BadG] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] ≤
∑
σ∈Γ
PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] ,
such that by Lemma 33, respectively Lemma 36, we get the following
continued estimate from (1), using the triangle inequality and that |Γ| ≤
|G|2qc+qf+qg (every combination of query elements).
|PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]|
≤ 2
∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] + 2qc(qc − 1)|G|−1
+ 2
∑
σ∈Γ
PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
+ 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2
≤ 2|Γ| · |G|−(2qc+qf+qg) ·max
σ∈Γ
Prk [σ ∈ BadG] + 2qc(qc − 1)|G|−1
+ 2|Γ| · |G|−(2qc+qf+qg) ·max
σ∈Γ
Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
+ 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2
≤ 4qgqc · |G|−1 + 2qc(qc − 1)|G|−1 + 2
(
q2c + 2qfqc + 2
(
qc
2
))
|G|−1 + 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2
= (2q2c + 4qgqc + 4qfqc + 2q
2
c − 2qc)|G|−1 + 2
(
qc
2
)(
2|G|−1 + |G|−2) .

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If we denote the total amount of queries as q = qc + qf + qg, then we may
quickly estimate and reword the main theorem as:
Theorem 38. Let f, g be modelled as random oracles, let k = (kL, kR) ∈R
G2, let Ψf,gk (x) = Fg,f,f,g(x · k) · k, and let R ∈R PG2→G2. Then, for any
4-oracle adversary A, with at most q total queries, we have∣∣∣Pr [AΨ,Ψ−1,f,g = 1]− Pr [AR,R−1,f,g = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ 2(3q2 − 2q)|G|−1 + (q2 − q)|G|−2.
Proof. Given Theorem 24, we get, by using that qf , qg ≥ 0,
q2c + 2qfqc + 2qgqc + q
2
c − qc
= 2(q2c + qfqc + qgqc)− qc
≤ 2(q2c + qfqc + qgqc) + (2(qf + qg)2 + 2(qfqc + qgqc)− qf − qg)− qc
= 2(q2c + 2qfqc + q
2
f + 2qfqg + 2qgqc + q
2
g)− (qc + qf + qg)
= 2(qc + qf + qg)
2 − (qc + qf + qg)
= 2q2 − q.
As 2·
(
qc
2
)
= q2c−qc ≤ q2−q, we get the final estimate by some reordering. 
6 Conclusion
We generalized the Even and Mansour scheme as well as the Feistel cipher
to work over arbitrary groups and proved that classical results pertain to
the group versions. Based on the work in [AR17], we hope that this opens
avenues to proving that classical schemes may be made quantum secure by
generalizing them to certain groups. For further work, we suggest generaliz-
ing other classical schemes and using the underlying group structures to do
Hidden Shift reductions.
The author would like to thank his thesis advisor Gorjan Alagic for the
topic, enlightening questions and answers, as well as the encouragements
along the way. The author would also like to thank the Department of
Mathematical Sciences, at the University of Copenhagen, for lending their
facilities during the writing process.
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A Super Pseudorandomness of the Group EM
Scheme
In the following, we assume that the adversary A is unbounded computa-
tionally, but may only make polynomially many queries to the E/D- and
P/P−1-oracles, where all oracles act as black boxes and P is a truly random
permutation. We intend to play the "pseudorandom or random permutation
game": A is given an encryption oracle E (with related decryption oracle
D) which is randomly chosen with equal probability from the following two
options:
1. A random key k ∈R G is chosen uniformly and used to encrypt as
E(m) = Ek(m) = P (m · k) · k, or
2. A random permutation pi ∈R PG→G is chosen and used to encrypt as
E(m) = pi(m).
The adversary wins the game if it can distinguish how E was chosen, with
probability significantly better than 1/2. More explicitly, we wish to prove
the following for the group Even-Mansour scheme.
Theorem 39. Assume P ∈R PG→G and let the key k ∈R G. For any
probabilistic adversary A, limited to polynomially many E/D- and P/P−1-
oracle queries, the adversarial advantage of A is bounded by
Adv(A) def=
∣∣∣Pr [AP,P−1Ek,Dk = 1]− Pr [AP,P−1pi,pi−1 = 1]∣∣∣ = O( st|G|
)
. (2)
where s is the total number of E/D-queries and t is the total number of
P/P−1-queries, i.e. the success probability is negligible.
Proof. We may assume that A is deterministic (in essence, being unbounded
computationally affords A the possibility of derandomizing its strategy by
searching all its possible random choices and picking the most effective choices
after having computed the effectiveness of each choice. For an example,
see [DR02].) We may also assume that A never queries a pair in Ss or Tt
more than once, where Si and Ti are the sets of i E/D- and P/P−1-queries,
respectively. Let us define two main games, that A could play, through oracle
interactions (see next page for the explicit game descriptions.)
Note that the steps in italics have no impact on the response to A’s
queries, we simply continue to answer the queries and only note if the key
turns bad, i.e. we say that a key k is bad w.r.t. the sets Ss and Tt if
28
there exist i, j such that either mi · k = xj or ci · k−1 = yj, and k is good
otherwise. There are at most 2st|G| bad keys.
Game R: We consider the random game which corresponds to the latter
probability in (2), i.e.
PR := Pr
[
AP,P−1pi,pi−1 = 1
]
.
From the definition of Game R, we see that, letting PrR denote the
probability when playing Game R,
PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PR, (3)
as we are simply giving uniformly random answers to each of A’s queries.
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Notation: We let S1i = {m|(m, c) ∈ Si}, S2i = {c|(m, c) ∈ Si}, T 1i = {x|(x, y) ∈ Ti}, and
T 2i = {y|(x, y) ∈ Ti}.
GAME R: Initially, let S0 and T0 be
empty and flag unset. Choose k ∈R G,
then answer the i+1’st query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. Choose ci+1 ∈R G \ S2i .
2. If P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i , or
P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , then set flag to
bad.
3. Define E(mi+1) = ci+1 (and thereby
also D(ci+1) = mi+1) and return ci+1.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. Choose mi+1 ∈R G \ S1i .
2. If P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , or
P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i , then set flag to bad.
3. Define D(ci+1) = mi+1 (and thereby
also E(mi+1) = ci+1) and return mi+1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. Choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i .
2. If E(xi+1 · k−1) ∈ S2i , or
D(yi+1 · k) ∈ S1i , then set flag to
bad.
3. Define P (xi+1) = yi+1 (and thereby
also P−1(yi+1) = xi+1) and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. Choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i .
2. If D(yi+1 ·k) ∈ S1i , or E(xi+1 ·k−1) ∈
S2i , then set flag to bad.
3. Define P−1(yi+1) = xi+1 (and
thereby also P (xi+1) = yi+1) and re-
turn xi+1.
GAME X: Initially, let S0 and T0 be
empty and flag unset. Choose k ∈R G,
then answer the i+1’st query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. Choose ci+1 ∈R G \ S2i .
2. If P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i then redefine
ci+1 := P (mi+1 · k) · k and set flag to
bad. Else if P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , then
set flag to bad and goto Step 1.
3. Define E(mi+1) = ci+1 (and thereby
also D(ci+1) = mi+1) and return ci+1.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. Choose mi+1 ∈R G \ S1i .
2. If P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i then redefine
mi+1 := P
−1(ci+1 · k−1) · k−1 and set
flag to bad. Else if P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i ,
then set flag to bad and goto Step 1.
3. Define D(ci+1) = mi+1 (and thereby
also E(mi+1) = ci+1) and return mi+1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. Choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i .
2. If E(xi+1 · k−1) ∈ S2i then redefine
yi+1 := E(xi+1 · k−1) · k−1 and set flag
to bad. Else if D(yi+1 · k) ∈ S1i , then
set flag to bad and goto Step 1.
3. Define P (xi+1) = yi+1 (and thereby
also P−1(yi+1) = xi+1) and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. Choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i .
2. If D(yi+1 · k) ∈ S1i then redefine
xi+1 := D(yi+1 · k) · k and set flag to
bad. Else if E(xi+1 ·k−1) ∈ S2i , then set
flag to bad and goto Step 1.
3. Define P−1(yi+1) = xi+1 (and
thereby also P (xi+1) = yi+1) and re-
turn xi+1.
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Game X: Consider the experiment which corresponds to the game played
in the prior probability in (2) and define this probability as
PX := Pr
[
AP,P−1Ek,Dk = 1
]
.
We define Game X, as outlined above. Note that again the parts in italics
have no impact on the response to A’s queries, however, this time, when a
key becomes bad, we choose a new random value repeatedly for the response
until the key is no longer bad, and then reply with this value. Intuitively,
Game X behaves like Game R except that Game X checks for consistency
as it does not want A to win on some collision. It is non-trivial to see that,
letting PrX denote the probability when playing Game X,
PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PX . (4)
The proof is given in Appendix B.
We have defined both games in such a way that their outcomes differ only
in the event that a key turns bad. Thus, any circumstance which causes a
difference in the instructions carried out by the games, will also cause both
games to set the flag to bad. Let BAD denote the event that the flag gets
set to bad and the case that the flag is not set to bad by ¬BAD, then the
two following lemmas follow from the previous statement.
Lemma 40. PrR [BAD] = PrX [BAD] and PrR [¬BAD] = PrX [¬BAD].
Lemma 41. PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
= PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
.
Using these two lemmas we are able to prove the lemma:
Lemma 42. Adv(A) ≤ PrR [BAD].
This is because, using (3), (4), and lemmas 40 and 41,
Adv(A) = |PX − PR|
=
∣∣∣PrX [AP,P−1E,D = 1]− PrR [AP,P−1E,D = 1]∣∣∣
= |PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
· PrX [¬BAD]
+ PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD
]
· PrX [BAD]
− PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
· PrR [¬BAD]
− PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD
]
· PrR [BAD] |
=
∣∣∣PrR [BAD] · (PrX [AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD]− PrR [AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD])∣∣∣
≤ PrR [BAD] .
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Let us now define yet another game, Game R’.
GAME R’: Initially, let S0 and T0 be empty and
flag unset. Answer the i + 1’st query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. Choose ci+1 ∈R G \ S2i .
2. Define E(mi+1) := ci+1 (and thereby also D(ci+1) := mi+1) and return ci+1.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. Choose mi+1 ∈R G \ S1i .
2. Define D(ci+1) := mi+1 (and thereby also E(mi+1) := ci+1) and return mi+1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. Choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i .
2. Define P (xi+1) := yi+1 (and thereby also P−1(yi+1) := xi+1) and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. Choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i .
2. Define P−1(yi+1) := xi+1 (and thereby also P (xi+1) := yi+1) and return
xi+1.
After all queries have been answered, choose k ∈R G. If there exists (m, c) ∈ Ss
and (x, y) ∈ Tt such that k becomes bad then set flag to bad.
This game runs as Game R except that it does not choose a key until
all of the queries have been answered and then checks for badness of the flag
(by checking whether or not the key has become bad). It can be shown that
the flag is set to bad in Game R if and only if the flag is set to bad in
Game R’ (by a consideration of cases (see Appendix C.)) Hence, we get the
following lemma.
Lemma 43. PrR [BAD] = PrR′ [BAD].
Using the above lemma, we now only have to bound PrR′ [BAD] in order
to bound Adv(A), but as the adversary queries at most s elements to the
E/D-oracles and at most t elements to the P/P−1-oracles, and the key k is
chosen uniformly at random from G, we have that the probability of choosing
a bad key is at most 2st/|G|, i.e.
Adv(A) ≤ PrR′ [BAD] = O
(
st
|G|
)
.

Restating the theorem, we get:
Theorem 44. For any probabilistic adversary A, limited to polynomially
many E/D- and P/P−1-oracle queries, the generalized EM scheme over a
group G is a super pseudorandom permutation.
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B Proof of probability of Game X
Recall the definition of S1i , S2i , T 1i and T 2i (see p. 30.) We write Ss and Tt
to denote the final transcripts. We drop the index i if it is understood. We
begin by defining Game X’.
GAME X’: Initially, let S0 and T0 be empty. Choose k ∈R G, then answer the
i+ 1’st query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. If P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i return P (mi+1 · k) · k
2. Else choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i , define P (mi+1 · k) = yi+1, and return yi+1 · k.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. If P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , return P−1(ci+1 · k−1) · k−1.
2. Else choose xi+1 ∈R G\T 1i , define P−1(ci+1·k−1) = xi+1, and return xi+1·k−1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. If P (xi+1) ∈ T 2i , return P (xi+1).
2. Else choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i , define P (xi+1) = yi+1, and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. If P−1(yi+1) ∈ T 1i , return P−1(yi+1).
2. Else choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i , define P−1(yi+1) = xi+1, and return xi+1.
Notice that the only difference between Game X’ and the game defin-
ing PX is that the latter has defined all values for the oracles beforehand
while the former "defines as it goes." Still, an adversary cannot tell the
difference between playing the Game X’ or the game defining PX . Thus,
PrX′
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PX .
What we wish to show is that
PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PrX′
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
,
i.e. that no adversary A may distinguish between playing Game X and
playing Game X’, even negligibly. We will do this by showing that no
adversary A may distinguish between the outputs given by the two games.
As both games begin by choosing a uniformly random key k and as we show
that for this value the games are identical, we hereby assume such a key k
to be a fixed, but arbitrary, value for the remainder of this proof.
Considering the definitions of Game X and Game X’, we see that the
two games define their E/D- and P/P−1-oracles differently: the former defin-
ing both, while the latter defines only the P/P−1-oracle and computes the
E/D-oracle. We show that Game X also answers its E/D-oracle queries by
referring to P/P−1, although not directly.
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Given the partial functions E and P in Game X, i.e. functions having
been defined for all values up to and including the i’th query, define the
partial function P̂ as the following.
P̂ (x)
def
=

P (x) if P (x) is defined,
E(x · k−1) · k−1 if E(x · k−1) is defined, and
undefined otherwise.
Using the above definition, defining a value for E or P implicitly defines
a value for P̂ . The first question is, whether or not P̂ is well-defined, i.e.
whether there are clashes of values (that is, differences between values differ-
ing by other than ·k (or ·k−1)) for some x for which both P (x) and E(x ·k−1)
are defined.
Lemma 45. Let E and P be partial functions arising in Game X, then the
partial function P̂ is well-defined.
Proof. Proof by induction on the number of "Define" steps in Game X (i.e.
steps E−3, D−3, P−3, and P−1−3) as these are the steps where P̂ becomes
defined. The initial case of the induction proof is trivial as S0 and T0 are
empty such that no values may clash. Suppose now that in step E − 3 we
define E(m) = c. The only possibility that P̂ becomes ill-defined will occur
if the new E(m) value clashes with a prior defined P (m ·k) value: If P (m ·k)
was not defined, then no clashes can arise. If P (m · k) was defined, then by
step E − 2, the value is E(m) · k−1, such that there is no clash.
For D − 3, the argument is similar as E(m) will become defined as well.
Although, for the case where P (m · k) is defined, step D − 2 forces a new
uniformly random value of m to be chosen until no clash occurs.
Analogously, for P and P−1, no clashes will arise, hence, P̂ must be
well-defined. 
We may also consider P̂ in Game X’, in the sense that when we define a
value for P in the game, we implicitly define a value for P̂ where P̂ (x) = P (x)
as E(x · k−1) = P (x) in Game X’.
We wish now to show that the oracle query-answers of E,D, P, and P−1
in Game X, expressed in terms of P̂ , correspond exactly to those in Game
X’.
Case 1: E-oracle query. Beginning with Game X, we first note that
Game X never defines E(m) unless m has been queried to the E-oracle,
or alternately, the D-oracle has been queried with a c such that E(m) = c.
However, as A never repeats a query if it can guess the answer, i.e. never
queries any part of an already defined E/D-oracle pair, we may assume that
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E(m) is undefined when m is queried. Therefore, we see that concurrently
with m being queried, we have that P̂ (m · k) will be defined if and only if
P (m · k) is defined, and P̂ (m · k) = P (m · k). Let us consider the two cases:
when P̂ (m · k) is defined and when it is undefined.
Case 1a: When P̂ (m · k) is defined, then Game X returns c = P̂ (m · k) · k.
Setting E(m) = c leaves P̂ unchanged, i.e. the value P̂ (m · k) remains
the same, unlike the next case.
Case 1b: When P̂ (m · k) is undefined, then Game X repeatedly chooses
c ∈R G \ S2 uniformly until P−1(c · k−1) is undefined, i.e. the set
U = {c ∈ G|P−1(c · k−1) 6∈ T 1}. It follows that y = c · k−1 is uni-
formly distributed over G \ T̂ 2.4 This can be seen by showing that
S2 ∪ U { = T̂ 2 · k, where the only non-triviality in the argument fol-
lows from the definition of P̂ . In this case, setting E(m) = c also sets
P̂ (m · k) = y, in contrast to the prior case as it is now defined.
We now consider the same query on Game X’.
Case 1a’ : When P̂ (m · k) = P (m · k) is defined, c = P (m · k) · k is returned, and
P̂ is unchanged.
Case 1b’ : When P̂ (m·k) = P (m·k) is undefined, we choose y ∈R G\T 2 = G\T̂ 2,
P̂ (m · k) is set to y, and c = y · k is returned.
Thus, the behaviour of Game X andGame X’ are identical on the E-oracle
queries.
We will be briefer in our arguments for the following 3 cases as the argu-
ments are similar.
Case 2: D-oracle query. Here we again assume that no element of
an E/D-oracle pair (m, c), such that E(m) = c, has been queried before.
Like in the above case, we see that, as P̂ (m · k) = P (m · k), we also have
P̂−1(c · k−1) = P−1(c · k−1).
Case 2a + 2a’ : When P̂−1(c ·k−1) = P−1(c ·k−1) is defined, then m = P−1(c ·k−1) ·k−1
is returned, leaving P̂−1(c · k−1) unchanged in both games.
Case 2b + 2b’ : If P̂−1(c · k−1) = P−1(c · k−1) is undefined, then x ∈R G \ T̂ 1 is chosen
uniformly and P̂−1(c · k−1) = x, in both cases.
4T̂ 1 and T̂ 2 are the corresponding sets on the query pairs of P̂ .
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Thus, the behaviour of Game X andGame X’ are identical on the D-oracle
queries.
Case 3: P -oracle query. Here we instead assume that no element of a
P/P−1-oracle pair (x, y) such that P (x) = y, has been queried before.
Case 3a + 3a’ : Using the definition of the E- and P -oracles in Game X and the
definition of P̂ we see that P (x) is defined if and only if E(x · k−1) is
defined, but then this also holds if and only if P̂ (x) is defined (by the
assumption in the beginning of case 3). Hence, if P̂ (x) is defined, then
y = E(x · k−1) · k−1 = P̂ (x). Indeed, both games secure this value.
Case 3b + 3b’ : If P̂ (x) is undefined, then y ∈R G \ T̂ 2 is chosen uniformly and P̂ (x) is
defined to be y, in both cases.
Thus, the behaviour of Game X andGame X’ are identical on the P -oracle
queries.
Case 4: P−1-oracle query. Again, we assume that no element of a
P/P−1-oracle pair (x, y) such that P (x) = y, has been queried before.
Case 4a + 4a’ : Using the definition of Game X and the definition of P̂ , as well as our
case 4 assumption, we see that P̂−1(y) is defined if and only if D(y · k)
is defined. Hence, if P̂−1(y) is defined, then x = D(y · k) · k = P̂−1(y).
Indeed, both games secure this value.
Case 4b + 4b’ : If P̂−1(y) is undefined, then x ∈R G\T̂ 1 is chosen uniformly and P̂−1(y)
is defined to be x, in both cases.
Thus, the behaviour of Game X and Game X’ are identical on the P−1-
oracle queries. Q.E.D.
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C Proof that the probability of Game R and
Game R’ match
Recall the definition of S1i , S2i , T 1i and T 2i (see p. 30). We write Ss and Tt to
denote the final transcripts. We also introduce the following definition.
Definition 46. We say that two E/D-pairs (mi, ci) and (mj, cj) overlap
if mi = mj or ci = cj. If mi = mj and ci = cj, we say that the pairs are
identical. Likewise for P/P−1-pairs (xi, yi) and (xj, yj).
If two pairs overlap, then by the definition of the E/D- and P/P−1-
oracles, they must be identical. Therefore, WLOG, we may assume that all
queries to the oracles are non-overlapping. Let us now prove the lemma.
Lemma 47. PrR [BAD] = PrR′ [BAD].
Proof. We need to prove that Game R has its flag set to bad if and only if
Game R’ has its flag set to bad.
"⇒": We want to show that there exists (m, c) ∈ Ss and (x, y) ∈ Tt
such that either m · k = x or c · k−1 = y (i.e. such that k becomes bad).
We have to consider the 8 cases where the flag is set to bad. All of the
cases use an analogous argument to the following: If P (m · k) is defined then
P (m · k) = y = P (x) for some (x, y) ∈ Tt such that, as overlapping pairs are
identical, m · k = x.
"⇐": We assume that there exists (m, c) ∈ Ss and (x, y) ∈ Tt such that
k becomes bad. i.e. such that either m · k = x or c · k−1 = y. We need to
check that in all four oracle queries, the flag in Game R is set to bad, which
needs a consideration of 8 cases.
Assume that m · k = x, then
E-oracle on m : P (m · k) = P (x) = y ∈ T 2t ,
D-oracle on c : P (m · k) = P (x) = y ∈ T 2t ,
P -oracle on x : E(x · k−1) = E(m) = c ∈ S2s ,
P−1-oracle on y : E(x · k−1) = E(m) = c ∈ S2s .
Assume now that c · k−1 = y, then
E-oracle on m : P−1(c · k−1) = P−1(y) = x ∈ T 1t ,
D-oracle on c : P−1(c · k−1) = P−1(y) = x ∈ T 1t ,
P -oracle on x : D(y · k) = D(c) = m ∈ S1s ,
P−1-oracle on y : D(y · k) = D(c) = m ∈ S1s .

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